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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In July 2012 the United Kingdom promulgated a new immigration rule 
requiring legal residents wishing to sponsor the entry of a foreign spouse to 
provide proof of access to an annual gross income of £18,600 (approximately 
$24,800), and additional savings of £16,000 (approximately $21,300).1  Such 
a rule raises questions about how and when domestic immigration policies 
intersect and come into conflict with the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR or the Convention).2  An inability to meet these income 
requirements has resulted in the separation of families, many with small 
children.3  
In June 2013 the BBC reported the story of Douglas Shillinglaw and his 
family.4  Because he cannot meet the new financial requirements, Mr. 
Shillinglaw is unable to reunite with his five-month-old son, his Nigerian 
wife, and his wife’s six-year-old son from a previous relationship.5  Mr. 
Shillinglaw is self-employed, and although he claims he has no problems 
paying his bills and mortgage, he is unable to sufficiently demonstrate to the 
Home Department he will be able to meet the financial income 
requirements.6  Mr. Shillinglaw also commented that the rules do not take 
into consideration the fact that he has family in the U.K. who would step in 
and help care for his wife and their children should anything happen to him.7  
Further, MM v. Secretary of the Home Department, a case decided in July 
2013, presents the stories of three lawful U.K. residents who are unable to 
sponsor visas for foreign family members due to a lack of sufficient income.  
The MM plaintiffs each presented the Court with slightly different 
circumstances rendering them incapable of meeting the £18,600 per-year-
income requirement.  The first plaintiff, MM, is a Lebanese refugee working 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Immigration Rules, Appendix FM, §§ E-ECP.3.1(a)–(b) (U.K.).   
 2 See MM v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900, [65]–[85] 
(Eng.) (providing a discussion of domestic and Human Rights Court cases challenging 
immigration rules on the basis of their violating the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
guarantee of respect for private and family life) [hereinafter MM].   
 3 Id. at [2]–[21] (describing three families unable to live together in the U.K. as a result of 
the U.K. resident being unable to meet financial minimums).  
 4 UK’s New Visa Rules ‘Causing Anguish’ for Families, BBC NEWS (June 10, 2013), http:// 
www.bbc.com/news/uk-22833136; see also UK Spouse Immigration Rules ‘Unjustified,’ High 
Court Says, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-23198144.  
 5 See UK’s New Visa Rules ‘Causing Anguish’ for Families, supra note 4. 
 6 Id. (“Self-employed income is different from employed income.  I have got enough 
money to pay my mortgage and bills, and that should be enough.”).   
 7 Id. (“And should anything happen to me I have a family who will take care of them.  My 
family are wholeheartedly behind what I am doing.”).  
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toward his Ph.D. at a British university.8  He is thirty-four and married to a 
Lebanese national who has a Bachelor of Science degree in nutrition and 
works in Lebanon as a pharmacist.9  Further, MM’s wife is fluent in 
English.10  Despite both MM and his wife clearly being qualified for a 
number of well-paying jobs, MM cannot meet the threshold requirement.  
MM takes particular issue with the rules for two reasons: (1) he cannot cite 
to his wife’s potential earning capacity to help meet the required threshold, 
and (2) he cannot rely on familial support, even when that support is 
documented by a covenant deed.11  
The second MM plaintiff is Abdul Majid, a British citizen who has lived 
in the U.K. since 1972.12  Mr. Majid’s wife, whom he married in 1991, lives 
in Pakistan.13  The couple has five children, four of whom have lived in the 
U.K. since 2001.14  Although Mr. Majid’s wife has been admitted to the U.K. 
for limited stays over the course of their marriage, she has now been 
indefinitely denied entry because of her husband’s lack of income.15  Mr. 
Majid’s chief complaint with the rules is that they separate his wife from the 
couple’s children.16 
The third and final complainant in MM is Shabana Javed.  Mrs. Javed is a 
British citizen who has limited work skills and who has been unable to find 
work above the £18,600 threshold.  Because she cannot find work that pays 
above the threshold, she cannot sponsor the entry of her husband, who 
currently works as a civil servant in Pakistan.17  Mrs. Javed has the same 
complaints as MM, but, in addition, argues the rules unjustifiably 
discriminate against British-Asian women.18  
Circumstances like those of Mr. Shillinglaw and the plaintiffs in MM 
implicate and demand the analysis of the convergence of domestic 
immigration law and the ECHR.  The U.K. adopted the ECHR in 1998 when 
Parliament voted to pass the Human Rights Act.19  Due to this domestic 
                                                                                                                   
 8 MM, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900, [4].  
 9 Id.  
 10 Id.  
 11 Id. at [7]–[8].  
 12 Id. at [13]. 
 13 Id.  
 14 Id.  
 15 Id. at [14].  
 16 Id. at [16].  
 17 Id. at [17]–[19].  
 18 Id. at [20]–[21] (explaining “socio-economic data demonstrates that this segment of 
society [British Asian women] suggests from significantly lower rates of pay or employment 
than others, notably men”).  
 19 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1 (Eng.).  
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legislation, the U.K. is bound to respect the rights contained in the ECHR, 
which the Human Rights Act mirrors. Therefore, if a U.K. immigration rule 
violates a right guaranteed to U.K. citizens by way of the Human Rights Act 
of 1998, it can be struck down “by the Administrative Court exercising its 
supervisory function in judicial review proceedings.”20  
The interplay between this particular immigration rule and the Human 
Rights Act (the Act) is especially significant because the rule’s legality is 
being challenged under Article 8 of the Act.21  Article 8 of the Act 
guarantees a right to respect for family and private life.22  It further states:  
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the 
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of 
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.23  
In recent years the European Court of Human Rights (the Strasbourg 
Court) has broadened the scope of the protection provided to nuclear families 
by Article 8 of the ECHR.24  Therefore, given the fact immigration rules are 
tightening in the U.K. while the Strasbourg Court is concurrently redefining 
what protections the ECHR guarantees, the question arises: where do British 
courts and legislators go from here?  Is this rule requiring lawful U.K. 
residents to produce proof of significant annual income and personal savings 
assets truly necessary to ensure British taxpayers are not burdened by 
immigration?  And what duties does the British government owe to non-
citizens related to lawful U.K. residents in light of the Strasbourg Court’s 
expanding interpretation of Article 8?  The answers to these questions will 
impact not only families currently separated because of the financial 
requirements, but will also impact the future of immigration regulation in 
Europe as a whole. 
                                                                                                                   
 20 MM v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900 [40] (Eng.).  
 21 Id.  
 22 Human Rights Act, supra note 19, art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”). 
 23 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
amended by Protocol No. 11, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 24 Daniel Thym, Respect for Private and Family Life Under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration 
Cases: A Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay?, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 87, 88 (2008).  
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This Note will focus on the recent MM decision and use this opinion as 
the basis for analyzing the intersection of the ECHR and domestic 
immigration law.25  Additionally, there will be a thorough discussion of 
recent decisions by the Strasbourg Court analyzing the extent to which 
Article 8 provides an avenue of attack against immigration laws restricting 
the ability of families to reunite and live together in European countries.  
First, this Note provides a discussion and overview of both the current 
state of European law, i.e., case law coming from the Strasbourg Court on 
the subject of Article 8, and of current U.K. case law interpreting and 
applying Article 8.  Second, this Note explains how the current financial 
requirement works and provides an overview of the government’s stated 
intentions for enacting the new financial requirement.  Third, this Note 
analyzes the proportionality of the current financial requirements.  Finally, 
this Note argues that European legislatures, domestic courts, and the 
Strasbourg Court should protect the recently developed expansive view of 
Article 8 protection for families.  Further, because immigration policy 
addressing family life and reunification can so easily run afoul of rights 
guaranteed in the ECHR, this Note advocates for immigration rules and 
policies allowing for a more individualized, case-by-case assessment of 
whether a lawful resident should be allowed to sponsor the entry of a foreign 
family member.  
II.  EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMMIGRATION AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS CASE LAW  
The modern British immigration system, as opposed to the system of 
immigration that existed during the time of the British Empire, began with 
the passage of the 1971 Immigration Act.26  The 1971 Immigration Act 
established categories of Commonwealth patrials and non-patrials.27  In other 
words, the U.K. recognized traditional citizen and non-citizen distinctions, 
and placed immigration rules and burdens on those individuals falling into 
the non-citizen category.28  Non-patrials, or non-citizens could not enter the 
U.K. without leave.29  Thus began the British system of complex 
immigration rules governing who can and cannot enter the country, and who 
                                                                                                                   
 25 MM v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900 (Eng.). 
 26 Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, 474 (1985). 
 27 Id.  
 28 VAUGHAN BEVAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH IMMIGRATION LAW 114 (1986) 
(“[P]atriality was used to describe those who were free from immigration control.”).  
 29 Abdulaziz, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 474.   
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can and cannot act as an entry sponsor for non-citizens living abroad.  From 
early on, many U.K. immigration rules did not apply equally to all foreign 
citizens.30  This remains true today.  Individuals who are citizens of other 
European Union countries, for example, do not have to meet work permit 
requirements in order to enter the U.K. for long periods of time.31  All other 
non-European Union nationals, however, do have to meet the requirements 
set out in the immigration rules.32  
These “rules,” are subject to judicial review because they work in practice 
as delegated legislation creating legal rights and obligations.33  A British 
court will be able to review these rules using a proportionality test.34  Thus, if 
a court holds that the rules present a disproportionate infringement on human 
rights when viewed in light of the government’s stated policy goal (i.e., 
ensuring U.K. citizens and residents sponsoring the immigration of a foreign 
national family member do not strain U.K. welfare programs), a court may 
declare them incompatible with the ECHR as domesticated via the Human 
Rights Act.35  With that background of U.K. immigration law and rules in 
mind, the discussion will now turn to the attempts of U.K. citizens and 
residents to challenge immigration rules as violating the ECHR. 
Beginning in the 1980s, European residents began challenging 
immigration rules and decisions on the theory that they violated the ECHR.36  
In Abdulazziz, the plaintiffs brought suit against the U.K. because the then-
existing immigration rules made it impossible for them, as lawful U.K. 
residents born outside the U.K. or born to parents not born in the U.K., to 
sponsor the entry of their husbands into the country.37  The Strasbourg Court 
handed down a detailed opinion drawing a number of important conclusions 
                                                                                                                   
 30 See BEVAN, supra note 28.   
 31 Id. at 47. 
 32 Id.  
 33 COLIN TURPIN & ADAM TOMPKINS, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TEXT 
AND MATERIALS 170–71 (7th ed. 2006) (discussing Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. Pankina, [2010] 3 WLR 1526).  
 34 Id. at 285–86 (discussing U.K. courts’ ability to review legislation challenged using the 
Human Rights Act, and explaining that Section 6 establishes “it is unlawful for a public 
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right”). 
 35 Id. at 85 (discussing Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, 
[2008] 1 AC 385 and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB, [2007] UKHL 46, 
[2008] 1 AC 440 which held control orders issued pursuant to primary legislation direction 
were excessive; and, therefore, thus disproportionate and contrary to the Human Rights Act). 
 36 See Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, 474 
(1985) (alleging decisions by immigration officials made under then current rules violated 
plaintiffs’ rights under Articles 3, 8, 13, and 14 of the ECHR). 
 37 Id. at 486–92.  
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that aid in the understanding of how the ECHR interacts with domestic 
immigration law.  
First, the Strasbourg Court recognized that nothing in the ECHR applies 
to non-citizens’ right to enter or remain in a participating country.38  The 
Convention only requires participating countries to respect the human rights 
described therein, and enact immigration protocols and laws that are in 
accord with the Convention and that do not violate any of those prescribed 
human rights.39  The Court reasoned that, because the complainants were 
lawful residents “being deprived or threatened with deprivation of the society 
of their spouses,” any domestic rules used to evaluate their applications to act 
as sponsors must be in accord with the Convention.40  
Second, the Court gave an early look into what was meant by “family 
life” as used in Article 8 of the Convention.41  The Court acknowledged that 
multiple definitions and interpretations of the word “family” may exist, but a 
proper definition must “include the relationship that arises from a lawful and 
genuine marriage . . . even if the family life of the kind referred to by the 
[U.K.] government has not yet been fully established.”42  Therefore, “family” 
under the ECHR does not necessarily have to conform to the definition given 
under domestic immigration law, but instead has a definition unique to its 
use in the Convention.  
Third, the Abdulaziz decision notes that Article 8’s prohibition on public 
officials’ arbitrary interference with one’s family life may include “positive 
obligations inherent in an effective respect for family life.”43  While there 
may in fact be positive obligations involved in respecting an individual’s 
family life, the Court did not find that such obligations included respecting 
someone’s right to sponsor a spouse married only after the resident-applicant 
moved to the U.K.44  
Fourth, despite finding Article 8 did not invalidate the rules at issue in 
Abdulaziz, the Court did hold the rules violated the Convention when read in 
combination with Article 14.  Article 14 of the Convention requires all other 
rights listed in the Convention be secured without discrimination on the basis 
of sex, race, color, or religion.45  Because under the then-existing rules it was 
                                                                                                                   
 38 Id. at 496.  
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 495. 
 41 Id. at 495–96. 
 42 Id. at 496.  
 43 Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 44 Id. at 497–98. 
 45 ECHR, supra note 23, art. 14. 
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significantly easier for a husband to sponsor a wife than for a wife to sponsor 
a husband, the rules effectively denied women their right to respect for 
family life more so than men.46  Finding such discrimination embedded in 
the rules, the Court found the U.K. immigration rule violated the plaintiffs’ 
Article 8 right to respect for family life when viewed through the lens of 
Article 14’s prohibition on discrimination.47  Because the Court in Abdulaziz 
(1) recognizes a lawful resident can challenge an immigration rule on Article 
8 grounds; (2) provides a glimpse at what “family life” means in the context 
of the Convention; (3) recognizes domestic government might have positive 
obligations to respect family life; and (4) invalidates a domestic immigration 
rule for reasons related to Article 8 of the Convention, the Court’s decision is 
crucial in understanding how the Strasbourg Court analyzes immigration 
rules in light of the Convention.  
The Strasbourg Court again addressed British immigration rules and 
whether—and how—they interfere with rights guaranteed by the Convention 
in O’Donoghue v. United Kingdom.48  This decision built upon the reasoning 
of R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, a decision rendered by a 
domestic U.K. court.49  In O’Donoghue, the Strasbourg Court was asked to 
determine if a British immigration rule requiring all individuals subject to 
immigration control to obtain a certificate of approval before marrying, and 
further requiring each applicant, i.e., both members of a couple, to pay a fee 
of £295.50  The applicants alleged this violated their right to marry and found 
a family.51  While the government supported this rule by claiming it was 
necessary to prevent sham marriages entered into for immigration benefits, 
the Strasbourg Court found the rule disproportionately burdened certain 
couples wishing to marry, regardless of the genuineness of the proposed 
marriages.52  The Strasbourg Court took further issue with the certificate of 
approval process because officials made application decisions without any 
investigation into the genuineness of the proposed marriage.53  Because the 
rule worked as a powerful disincentive to marriage and did not include a 
requirement of investigation to further its goal of preventing sham marriages 
aimed at obtaining a more favorable immigration status, the Strasbourg Court 
                                                                                                                   
 46 Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, 503 (1985).  
 47 Id.  
 48 O’Donoghue v. United Kingdom, (2010) 53 EHRR 1. 
 49 Id.; R (on the applications of Balai and Others) v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t, 
[2008] UKHL 53.  
 50 O’Donoghue v. United Kingdom, (2010) 53 EHRR at [24]. 
 51 Id. at [60]. 
 52 Id. at [89].  
 53 Id.  
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held that the rule violated the applicants’ Article 12 guaranteed right to 
marry.54  
The Strasbourg Court again addressed an immigration rule’s validity 
under the ECHR in Boultif v. Switzerland.55  The plaintiff in this case, an 
Algerian national married to a Swiss citizen, was expelled from Switzerland 
after the Swiss government denied his application to renew his residence 
permit because he had been convicted of illegal weapons possession.56  The 
plaintiff’s wife objected to being forced to follow her husband to Algeria.57  
The government’s position, and that taken by the Swiss courts that reviewed 
the plaintiff’s appeals to the denial of his residence renewal, was that the 
expulsion was necessary to preserve public order and safety.58  While the 
Strasbourg Court recognized ensuring public safety to be a legitimate 
government interest, they found that responding to a concern about public 
safety posed by a one-time offender did not properly balance the relevant 
interests, and amounted to a violation of plaintiff’s Article 8 right to respect 
for family life.59  The Strasbourg Court notably began its discussion of 
whether or not there had, in fact, been a violation of Article 8 by explaining 
that when determining whether or not an immigration law has violated the 
ECHR, the Court is to balance the interest of the individual right on the one 
hand and the prevention of the identified societal harm, or furtherance of 
societal benefit, on the other.60  Thus, the Strasbourg Court made clear that 
infringing on an individual right guaranteed by the ECHR is only tolerated 
when the contracting government can show that the infringement is 
outweighed by, and proportionate to, a legitimate government interest.  
                                                                                                                   
 54 Id. at [91]–[92].  
 55 Boultif v. Switzerland, [2001] ECHR 497. 
 56 Id. at [6]–[14].  
 57 Id. at [16] (“[T]he applicant’s wife complained of being expected to follow her husband 
to Algeria.  While admitting that she spoke French, she claimed that she would have no work 
in Algeria and no money.  She found it most shocking that a married couple was being 
separated.”). 
 58 Id. at [34] (“Given the offences which the applicant had committed in Switzerland, there 
could be no doubt that the refusal not to renew the residence permit was called for in the 
interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime and for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.”). 
 59 Id. at [47]–[56] (“The Court is therefore of the opinion that the interference was not 
proportionate to the aim pursued.”).  
 60 Id. at [47] (“Accordingly, the Court’s task consists in ascertaining whether in the 
circumstances the refusal to renew the applicant’s residence permit struck a fair balance 
between the relevant interests, namely the applicant’s right to respect for his family life, on the 
one hand, and the prevention of disorder or crime, on the other.”). 
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III.  DOMESTIC IMMIGRATION HUMAN RIGHTS CASE LAW 
When reviewing the validity of an immigration rule in light of human 
rights set forth in the Convention, both common law domestic courts and the 
Strasbourg Court must determine whether a given immigration rule’s 
infringement on individuals’ right to family life is justified by the stated 
government interest.  The U.K. Supreme Court addressed the proportionality 
of an immigration rule most recently in Quila v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department.61  In Quila, the Court was faced with determining 
whether rules designed to prevent forced marriages interfered with a person’s 
right to enjoy his or her family life as granted in Article 8 of the Human 
Rights Act of 1998.62  The rule at issue in Quila prevented British citizens 
under the age of twenty-one from sponsoring the entry of his or her spouse’s 
entry into the country.63  The government’s stated purpose for this rule was 
to prevent forced marriages.64  At issue before the Court was whether the ban 
on sponsoring a spouse’s entry based purely on age was a legally proper way 
to deal with the problem of forced marriage.65  The Court recognized that the 
Home Office was justified in trying everything possible to prevent or inhibit 
forced marriages, but held the rule arbitrarily infringed on the right of 
citizens under age twenty-one to found a family life.66  The government cited 
statistics demonstrating that 28% of all cases of forced marriages between 
2005 and 2008 involved eighteen to twenty-year-olds, and argued the older 
the individual, the better equipped he or she is likely to be to resist pressure 
to enter a forced marriage.67  The critical question was why the need to 
protect these vulnerable age groups from being forced into marriages 
required a rule that interfered with the fundamental right of a far greater 
number of people—namely, all eighteen to twenty-year-olds voluntarily 
choosing to marry.68  The Court reasoned that because the number of 
innocent applicants unfairly being forced to delay marriage, or cohabitation 
after marriage, for up to three years was vastly more than the number of 
forced marriages the rule would theoretically prevent or inhibit, the rule was 
                                                                                                                   
 61 Quila v. Sec. State for the Home Dep’t, [2011] UKSC 45, 1 A.C. 621 [50].  
 62 Id. at [1]–[2]. 
 63 Id. at [7]–[8]. 
 64 Id.  
 65 Id. at [1].  
 66 Id. at [4].  
 67 Id. at [10].  
 68 Id. at [62].  
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a disproportionate infringement on the right to found a family life.69  The 
Court wrote, for the State to make exile for one of the spouses the price of 
exercising the right to marry and embark on family life requires powerful 
justification.70  
The U.K. Supreme Court found the government did not meet its burden of 
proving that the possibility of frustrating a small number of forced marriages 
justified intruding on the guaranteed right to make a reality of living together 
as a married couple. Quila is important because it shows that domestic 
British courts, in reviewing immigration rules and their conflicts with Article 
8 rights, are not merely inquiring into whether or not there is some rational 
link between the public interest and a given immigration rule supporting an 
intrusion on individual rights.  Instead, British courts must investigate 
whether or not an immigration rule’s interference with an individual’s right 
to family life is proportional to the public interest.  If the public interest is 
marginal, or the interest is only furthered by the immigration rule marginally, 
and the infringement on an individual’s right to family life is substantial, the 
rule cannot be maintained. 
The case of R, which was heard in domestic court, dealt with an 
immigration rule requiring marriage certificates of approval for individuals 
who were subject to immigration control.71  The House of Lords, sitting as 
the highest U.K. Court at the time, found the law was discriminatory and 
disproportionately interfered with the right to marry.72  Lord Bingham noted 
that countries have every right to establish rules and policies aimed at 
preventing marriages of convenience, but this ability to regulate is not 
without limits.73  Specifically, the Court noted tying one’s ability to marry to 
one’s ability to pay a pre-determined fee was in direct conflict with Article 
12 as it may “impair the essence of the right to marry.”74  Read together, 
domestic cases like Quila and R and Strasbourg cases like Abdulaziz, 
O’Donoghue, and Boultif establish important principles of analysis for 
immigration rules promulgated by parties to the ECHR.  Both domestic 
courts and the Strasbourg Court are open to applicants’ appeals of 
immigration rules on human rights grounds, and in recent years—especially 
                                                                                                                   
 69 Id. at [58]–[62] (“What seems clear is that the number of unforced marriages which it 
obstructs from their intended development for up to three years vastly exceeds the number of 
forced marriages which it deters.”). 
 70 Id. at [54]. 
 71 R (on the applications of Balai and Others) v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] 
UKHL 53.  
 72 Id. at [32]. 
 73 Id. at [29].  
 74 Id. at [30].  
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the last five to ten years—have been using human rights doctrine to 
aggressively check the power of immigration rules harshly impacting 
immigrant families who wish to live and marry in the U.K.  
IV.  CURRENT IMMIGRATION RULES: FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SPONSORING A FOREIGN FAMILY MEMBER’S ENTRY INTO THE  
UNITED KINGDOM 
MM concerns current financial requirements placed on U.K. residents 
seeking to sponsor the entry of a foreign spouse, or the entry of a foreign 
spouse and children.75  The intent of the government in passing these rules in 
July 2012 is presented in a detailed statement issued by the Home Office 
when the rule was promulgated.76  The stated purpose of these financial 
requirements is to ensure relationships benefitting from immigration are not 
false, and to limit the impact of immigrants on taxpayers.77  The Statement of 
Intent introduces and explains the financial requirements in a list of 
particular methods to be used in the government’s attempts to curtail the 
effects of immigration on the welfare system.78  Second, the Statement of 
Intent clearly establishes the income minimums that will apply to all 
residents seeking to apply to sponsor a family member’s visa.79  
Moreover, the Statement of Intent specifically addresses Article 8 and 
how it interacts with the new immigration rules.80  These new immigration 
rules, according to the Home Office, are meant to create a system where 
candidates are judged based on predetermined and easily identifiable 
characteristics.81  Further, the new rules are meant to combine case law 
discussing Article 8 with immigration policy so that the Border Agency is 
                                                                                                                   
 75 See supra Part I.  
 76 HOME OFFICE, STATEMENT OF INTENT: FAMILY MIGRATION (2012), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257359/soi-f 
am-mig.pdf. 
 77 Id. at [16] (“[O]ur approach under the new Immigration Rules will ensure that there is a 
clear focus on whether the relationship is genuine, that the sponsor can properly support their 
partner and any dependants financially. . . .”). 
 78 Id. at [17] (“In particular, we will set a minimum income threshold of £18,600 to sponsor 
the settlement in the UK of a non-EEA partner. . . . The relevant minimum income threshold 
will apply at every application stage: entry clearance/leave to remain, further leave to remain 
and indefinite leave to remain (settlement).”). 
 79 Id.  
 80 Id. at [28]–[69].  
 81 Id. at [31]. 
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able to evaluate applications in light of existing Article 8 case law.82  
According to the Home Office, the new immigration rules, including the 
income minimums required for sponsorship, are proportionate and serve the 
public interest by ensuring immigrants do not threaten the economic well-
being of the U.K.83  The Home Office stresses the new rules’ focus on 
balancing the demands of Article 8, as established by both the Strasbourg 
Court and domestic courts, with the demands of running an economically 
viable country.84  
While the Statement of Intent declares that only cases with extreme 
circumstances will need to be adjudicated before the court, just one year after 
the rules went into effect an administrative court was forced to review the 
proportionality of the newly enacted income minimums required to sponsor 
the entry of a foreign family member.85  Thus, while the Statement of Intent 
is clearly well-intentioned and means to show that the government has in fact 
recognized the convergence of Article 8 and immigration rules, the recent 
litigation in this area indicates the government’s good faith attempts at curing 
defects in the immigration rules may have interfered with individuals’ human 
rights.  
V.  CURRENT RULES AND EXISTING CASE LAW 
The Statement of Intent accompanying the July 2012 immigration rules 
explains that the financial requirement rule aims to create a regime in which 
individuals applying to sponsor a family member must meet the “clear, 
transparent requirements on the face of the rules.”86  The U.K. government 
states these clear, transparent requirements are necessary to solve the public 
policy vacuum that was facing immigration courts prior to the challenges.87  
The problem was that courts were charged with the task of determining 
whether or not a given immigration rule applied to a specific set of facts, was 
disproportionate in light of the rights protected by Article 8, but were not 
                                                                                                                   
 82 Id. (“The new Immigration Rules will unify consideration under the rules and Article 8, 
by defining the basis on which a person can enter or remain in the UK on the basis of their 
family or private life.”). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at [33] (“The requirements of the new Immigration Rules will themselves reflect the 
Government’s and Parliament’s view of how, as a matter of public policy, the balance should 
be struck between the right to respect for private and family life and the public interest in 
safeguarding the economic well-being of the UK by controlling immigration. . . .”). 
 85 See MM, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900. 
 86 HOME OFFICE, supra note 76, ¶ [31].  
 87 Id. ¶ [36]. 
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given any information about what public interests weighed in favor of 
infringing on an individual’s right to family life.88  The changes in the rules 
represent the government’s attempt to give direction to courts analyzing 
whether a rule violates Article 8 by presenting judges with rules designed to 
strike the appropriate balance between individual rights and public policy 
concerns.89  So, while the old rules tasked courts with determining whether a 
specific application of a specific rule ran afoul of Article 8, the new scheme 
tasks courts with determining whether a given rule itself runs afoul of Article 
8.90  
Not only have the immigration rules’ substantive content changed, but 
perhaps more importantly, the way in which courts approach cases where 
immigration rules are challenged has likewise been modified.  As the 
government explains in its Statement of Intent, if a court finds the application 
of a rule infringes on an individual’s right to private and family life in a 
manner disproportionate to the public interest, the whole rule is in jeopardy 
and may be struck down as a violation of Article 8.91 
Abdulaziz, O’Donoghue, and Boultif are cases in which the Strasbourg 
Court held domestic immigration laws violated in whole or part Article 8 of 
the ECHR.  Based on this case law, the financial requirements currently 
burdening British citizens hoping to live in the U.K. with a foreign national 
spouse are likewise violations of Article 8’s guaranteed right to respect for 
private and family life.  Because the Strasbourg Court recognized “family 
life” as it’s used in the Convention, the term includes, at a minimum, the 
relationship formed by a genuine marriage.92  The government of a party 
state, like the U.K., has a positive duty to not arbitrarily interfere with a 
lawful resident’s ability to enter into a genuine marriage.93  Under Abdulaziz, 
party has an inherent obligation to respect lawful residents’ right to found a 
family via genuine marriage.94  Thus, the current financial threshold 
applicants must meet in order to sponsor a spouse’s entry into the country at 
some level infringes on their Article 8 rights.  The relevant question then 
becomes, is this infringement justified by and proportional to the public 
policy it claims to further?  If the answer is no, and the harm caused by the 
                                                                                                                   
 88 Id. ¶ [37].  
 89 Id. ¶ [38].  
 90 Id. ¶ [39]. 
 91 Id. ¶¶ [38]–[40]. 
 92 See Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, 495–96 
(1985). 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. 
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interference with the right to found a family is far greater than the good that 
will be achieved by the rule, the rule cannot stand.  
The Strasbourg Court’s opinion in O’Donoghue sheds even more light on 
the conflict between the current financial threshold and the ECHR.  Because 
the rule at issue in O’Donoghue imposed a fee on immigrants seeking to get 
married, the Strasbourg Court held the rule created an impediment to 
marriage, a right guaranteed by Article 12.95  Further, because marriage is a 
relationship which forms family life, the rule also failed to respect family 
life, as mandated by Article 8.96  The purpose of the rule, according to the 
government, was to deter marriages entered into solely for immigration 
benefits.97  The government reasoned that the fee would weed out those 
marrying for convenience, and only those who truly wished to marry would 
bother to proceed with marriage and pay the fee.98  Because the rule imposed 
a financial burden on all immigrants trying to marry without any 
investigation into whether or not the marriage was in fact genuine or a sham, 
the Strasbourg Court found the rule disproportionate.99  The interference with 
marriage and family life was not proportional to the public interest of 
preventing sham marriages.100  O’Donoghue shows that the Strasbourg Court 
views rules that financially burden immigrants as suspect.  Without sufficient 
justification from the government showing what legitimate aim the burden 
will actually further, a rule using a financial burden as a tool to effectuate 
public policy goals unduly burdens individuals when it interferes with a right 
guaranteed by the ECHR.  
The income threshold at issue in this Note is likewise a financial burden 
placed indiscriminately on all immigrants and immigrant spouses, and is 
therefore suspect.  The rule is only a valid intrusion on the right of 
individuals to live together as a family if the threshold is truly going to 
further a public policy goal, and will further that goal without burdening 
British citizens and lawful residents who pay into the welfare system.  The 
current financial minimums exist for two reasons.  First, the government 
wants to prevent individuals benefitting from sham marriages.  Second, the 
government does not want immigration to lead to an increase in the number 
of people asking for public assistance.  The government must be able to 
show that the threshold is set so that it captures those who are entering sham 
                                                                                                                   
 95 See O’Donoghue v. United Kingdom, (2010) 53 EHRR 1; ECHR, supra note 23, arts. 8, 12. 
 96 See O’Donoghue v. United Kingdom, (2010) 53 EHRR 1; ECHR, supra note 23, art. 8. 
 97 See O’Donoghue v. United Kingdom, (2010) 53 EHRR 1.  
 98 Id.  
 99 Id. at [88].  
 100 Id. at [73]. 
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marriages or would be asking for public funds, while also allowing 
individuals in genuine marriages who will not need public assistance to 
sponsor the entry of spouses and other family members.  
Finally, the Strasbourg Court’s decision in Boultif underscores the recent 
focus on proportionality.  The Swiss government breached its duty of respect 
for family life by expelling Mr. Boultif from Switzerland following a 
conviction for illegal weapons possession and aggravated assault, despite the 
fact this meant his wife, a Swiss citizen, would be forced to follow him to his 
native Algeria.101  Because Mr. Boultif had not had any other legal issues, he 
was released from prison early because of exemplary behavior and had job 
prospects in Switzerland that the Court found satisfactory.  Despite this, the 
burden of forcing Mr. Boultif’s Swiss wife to move to a foreign country in 
order to preserve her family was severe.102  Because of the discrepancy 
between the infringement on individual rights and the potential public benefit 
of that infringement, the Court held the rule disproportionate.103  
Boultif shows that the main consideration when determining whether or 
not a given immigration rule violates Article 8 is to balance the harm to the 
individual right with the benefit the interference will produce.  Applying this 
test to the financial minimums at issue here, the government must be able to 
prove that the financial minimum requirements will actually prevent an 
increase in families with immigrant members calling on public welfare 
assistance or inhibit more sham marriages than genuine marriages.  If the 
financial minimums will not prevent these feared increases or stop an 
increase already observed, then there is no justification for infringing on 
lawful residents’ and citizens’ right to marry and found a family with the 
person of their choosing. 
Additionally, domestic case law also supports the conclusion that the 
current financial requirements for sponsoring a foreign national spouse 
unjustifiably interfere with British citizens’ right to respect for family life.  In 
Quila, the British Supreme Court held invalid an immigration rule 
prohibiting British citizens under age twenty-one from sponsoring a spouse’s 
entry into the country because it arbitrarily infringed on rights guaranteed by 
the Human Rights Act.104  The Quila Court noted that the government 
interest in preventing forced marriages was valid.105  Likewise, preventing an 
increase in immigrant families seeking welfare assistance—the government 
                                                                                                                   
 101 See Boultif v. Switzerland, [2001] ECHR 497. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Quila v. Sec. State for the Home Dep’t, [2011] UKSC 45, 1 A.C. 621. 
 105 Id. at [45].  
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interest lying behind the financial requirements—is also valid.106  However, 
also like the immigration rule at issue in Quila, the financial requirements at 
issue here arguably burden far more individuals who will not end up seeking 
government assistance than those individuals who would seek assistance if 
admitted into the country.107  Further, the Quila Court took issue with the 
fact that the rule was applied with no investigation into the genuineness of 
these young people’s marriages.  Similarly, the financial requirement rule is 
extremely exclusionary and provides for no investigation into the actual 
financial situation of an applicant.  For example, there is no allowance for 
family financial assistance that might help an applicant meet the threshold 
requirement.  
Both the law at issue in Quila and the instant financial requirement rule 
use raw numbers to make decisions impacting a person’s right to found a 
family.  While lines must be drawn when operating a large and complex 
bureaucratic immigration system, Quila points out that these numerical lines 
must be narrowly tailored to the government interest being pursued so as not 
to overtly infringe on guaranteed human rights.  Rules infringing on these 
rights must be carefully applied so as not to burden individuals who are not 
contributing to the problem the rule itself is seeking to rectify. 
The current financial requirements are arguably worse infringements on 
the right to found a family than was the age limit placed on marriages in 
Quila.  First, the Quila rule’s burden and the financial requirement burden 
are not nearly the same.  It is a fact of life that everyone ages.  An eighteen-
year-old impacted by the Quila rule would be able, after waiting a few years, 
to sponsor the entry of his or her spouse.  While the court properly found that 
mandating that waiting period was disproportionate to the government’s end 
goal, the burden on an individual’s right was not permanent.  The financial 
rule at issue here, however, is much more likely to be permanent.  Some 
individuals may never have a job paying a yearly income over £18,600.  And 
while there is a provision allowing for personal savings to make up for lack 
of yearly income, it could take well over three years for a lower-income 
individual to save the required £16,000 necessary to overcome falling below 
                                                                                                                   
 106 See MM, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900, [110] (“The Secretary of State is entitle to 
conclude the economic and social welfare of the whole community is promoted by measures 
that require spouses to be maintained at a somewhat higher level than the bare subsistence 
level set under previous interpretations of the rules.”).   
 107 See UK’s New Visa Rules ‘Causing Anguish’ for Families, supra note 4. 
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the income threshold.108  The burden struck down in Quila is clearly less 
intense than the burden imposed by the current financial requirements.  
In addition to the Quila decision, the House of Lords decision in the case 
of R supports the conclusion that the current financial requirements for 
spousal sponsorship are invalid infringements on the right to respect for 
family life.  While the Supreme Court held the R law invalid under Article 
12, which guarantees the right to marry, and not Article 8, the right to respect 
for family life, the decision is still illustrative of how a domestic court should 
analyze a human rights challenge to an immigration rule.  As the court in R 
noted, “[t]he Strasbourg authorities have not in practice upheld the right to 
found a family with the same firmness they have shown in upholding the 
right to marry.”109  Thus, where the right to respect for family life is at issue, 
U.K. courts recognize the most strenuous review is required.  
In R, the House of Lords inquired into whether requiring a couple subject 
to immigration control (whether one party or both) to pay a fee in order to 
obtain a marriage certificate violated an individual’s right to marry.  The 
Court held this fee was unnecessary for furthering the state’s goal of 
preventing marriages of convenience.110  Just as that Court held a financial 
limit unrelated to the government’s interest in enacting an immigration rule 
was an invalid infringement on the right to marry, the financial requirements 
at issue here must be held invalid if they are not directly related to the 
government’s goal of preventing new immigrants burdening the welfare 
system.  A financial burden cannot be placed on an individual for no reason.  
There must a legitimate purpose for the burden.   
VI.  PROPORTIONALITY OF CURRENT FINANCIAL MINIMUMS 
An expanding definition of family life means British immigration laws 
must be cognizant of the myriad forms a family’s life may take.  Because the 
duty to recognize respect for family life is an important human right, the 
British government must also take care to craft immigration rules that further 
                                                                                                                   
 108 See Immigration Rules, supra note 1 (explaining an applicant who does not meet the 
standard £18,600 gross annual income requirement may, in the alternative, meet the 
requirement by showing “specified saving of £16,000; and additional savings of an amount 
equivalent to 2.5 times the amount which is the difference between the gross annual income 
from the gross annual income listed in paragraph E-ECP .3.2.(a)-(d) and the total amount 
required under paragraph E-ECP.3.1(a) [i.e. £18,600]”).  
 109 R (on the applications of Balai and Others) v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] 
UKHL 53, [15].  
 110 Id. at [30] (“It is plain that a fee fixed at a level which a needy applicant cannot afford 
may impair the essence of the right to marry.”). 
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public policy goals that only infringe on individuals’ right to found a family 
in an amount proportional to the public policy interest being pursued, such as 
ensuring new immigrants do not place an added burden on taxpayer funded 
welfare assistance programs.  There must be safeguards in immigration rules 
allowing for British families of all types to live in the U.K.  This means an 
immigration rule setting a strict financial requirement is over-inclusive.  
Under the framework presented by the U.K. government in their 2012 
Statement of Intent, all immigration rules should be proportional to the 
public policy objectives identified by the government.111  Here, that means 
that the financial minimums must be proportional to the goal of ensuring that 
immigrants joining British family members in the U.K. are not doing so at 
the expense of British taxpayers.  Because the financial minimums currently 
required do not vary based on any case-specific circumstances, the rule is 
arguably over broad and not proportional.  The Statement of Intent explains 
the financial minimum requirement was set at £18,600 because that is the 
average income at which a couple is no longer eligible for government 
assistance.112  While immigration caseworkers do have the ability to make 
further inquiries or request further information if the threshold requirement 
appears to be met,113 they “have no discretion or flexibility with regard to the 
level of the financial requirement.”114  It is also noteworthy that the 
paragraph explaining a caseworker’s discretion to request further information 
focuses exclusively on situations in which the caseworker is suspicious the 
applicant has somehow appeared to meet the requirement, but in fact has 
not.115  The government, by the structure of its Statement of Intent, appears 
to be working under the assumption that applicants will attempt to forge the 
                                                                                                                   
 111 HOME OFFICE, supra note 76. 
 112 R (on the application of Balai and Others) v. Sec. of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] 
UKHL 53, [15]. 
 113 Id. at [83(d)].  
 114 Id. at [83(c)] (“[A] minimum gross annual income of £18,600 (or the relevant higher figure 
where a child or children are also being sponsored) is the threshold to be met in all cases through 
income (and/or the application of cash savings as below).  It is a matter of public policy to 
introduce a financial requirement based on an income threshold for this form of sponsorship, and 
a threshold means a threshold: it must be clear and consistent in all cases.”). 
 115 Id. at [83(d)] (“Entry clearance officers and other caseworkers will be able to refuse the 
current application (or that at the next leave stage) if they have evidence that the applicant or 
sponsor has deceived them as to the level and/or source of income, has tried to do so, or has 
withheld relevant information, e.g., that the cash savings relied upon are a loan.  Entry 
clearance officers and other caseworkers will also be able to refuse an application if they are 
told by the applicant, or establish, that the applicant’s or sponsor’s circumstances have 
changed materially since the point of application, such that the applicant does not meet the 
requirements.”).  
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record of their financial status.  Given that a caseworker has no discretion to 
investigate applications falling just under the threshold, it is unsurprising 
there would be those who might stretch the truth of their financial situation in 
an attempt to sponsor the entry of a spouse.  
The current financial minimum requirement rule does not allow all British 
citizens to exercise their right to found a family, denies that right in an 
arbitrary manner, and is thus a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR.  As the 
Strasbourg Court noted in MM, “it would be difficult to exercise . . . the right 
to found a family if there are serious obstacles to matrimonial 
cohabitation.”116  The current rule applies indiscriminately and leaves little to 
no room for Home Department officials to inquire into an applicant’s 
financial status. Decisions of both British and European courts show a 
preference for a more individualized review of immigration cases.117  The 
current financial requirements for sponsoring a spouse’s entry into the U.K. 
leave no room for discretion, which can be a useful device for successfully 
protecting human rights while also furthering government policy goals.  
While the stated government interests are unquestionably valid, the 
government bears the burden of proving those goals are being furthered with 
narrowly tailored policies.  Going forward, European courts should continue 
to require parties to the ECHR to carefully draft immigration legislation 
impacting families’ ability to live together, and review such legislation with 
a sharp eye.  While these courts have not said this explicitly, it is reasonable 
to infer they are moving toward a doctrine of least restrictive means. 
VII.  CRITICISM OF MM V. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOME DEPARTMENT 
As addressed above, the case of MM is meant to serve as the basis for a 
discussion about the current conflicts between British immigration laws and 
the ECHR.  Now that the framework for analyzing immigration rules and the 
Human Rights Act has been presented, the MM decision can be properly 
evaluated.  The 2012 immigration rules, including the financial requirements 
at issue in MM and at issue in this Note, were drafted with Article 8 case law 
in mind.118  The administrative court that heard MM held the financial 
                                                                                                                   
 116 MM, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900, [101].  
 117 Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, 474 (1985); 
Boultif v. Switzerland, [2001] ECHR 497; R (on the applications of Balai and Others) v. Sec. 
of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] UKHL 53.  
 118 HOME OFFICE, supra note 76, ¶ [31] (“The new Immigration Rules will unify 
consideration under the rules and Article 8, by defining the basis on which a person can enter 
or remain in the U.K. on the basis of their family or private life.”). 
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requirements to be valid, but also recognized the merit of the plaintiffs’ 
claim.119  While the court notes that the government is pursuing legitimate 
goals by using financial requirements to limit the number of immigrants 
seeking taxpayer-funded welfare, the court’s decision can be criticized for 
incorrectly analyzing the financial requirements’ burdens and benefits. 
First, the court determined that the law is not using the least restrictive 
means possible.120  As explained, this is the standard currently governing any 
party state’s immigration rules interfering with an individual’s right to form a 
family of his or her choosing, or I would argue, interfering with any right 
guaranteed by the ECHR.  Discussing the financial requirements for 
supporting a foreign national spouse, the court concluded: “[T]aken together 
they [the financial requirements] are more than is necessary to promote the 
legitimate aim.”121  For instance, Justice Blake, writing for the court, 
admonishes the Secretary of State for using such an inflexible rule when the 
right of a lawful citizen to live in their home country with their spouse is at 
stake.122  The court suggests using a twelve-month review process in order to 
ensure the financial standing an applicant claimed on his or her application is 
reflected in reality.123  Additionally, the opinion points out that the £18,600 is 
well above the annual gross income someone would earn working for 
minimum wage forty hours per week.124  The court notes the alternative 
method available for proving financial stability—using personal savings—is 
a substantial burden, and in most cases will require an individual show 
savings in excess of the standard £18,600 requirement.125  
Second, the court explains in detail that the current financial requirement 
is disproportionate to the government’s stated aims.126  The Statement of 
                                                                                                                   
 119 MM, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900, [154]–[155].  
 120 Id. at [147] (“There are a variety of less intrusive responses available.”).  
 121 Id. at [144].  
 122 Id. at [140] (“The aim of transparency cannot justify an agglomeration of measures that 
cumulatively very severely restrict the ability of many law abiding and decent citizens of this 
nation who happen not to earn substantial incomes in their employment from living with their 
spouses in the land of their nationality.”).  
 123 Id. (“[C]hecks after twelve months may well be proportionate and informative as that 
would afford a reasonable opportunity for the spouse with skills to have attended selection 
interviews and demonstrated requisite skills.”).  
 124 Id. at [124] (explaining an income of £13,600 is the average income of someone working 
a 40 hour work week at minimum wage in the U.K.).   
 125 Id. at [107] (“The alternative mode of proof by saving requires the sponsor to meet the 
income shortfall by savings over £16,000. . . . Thus, MM states he has a shortfall in income of 
£3,000 per annum.  He would need to supplement that income by savings £16,000 plus £3,000 
X 2.5 = £23,500 to be able to sponsor his wife’s admission.”).  
 126 Id. at [142] (“[T]he combination of features . . . amount together to a disproportionate 
interference with the rights of British citizen sponsors and refugees to enjoy respect for family 
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Intent for the financial requirements at issue explicitly gives the court the 
power to evaluate the proportionality of the new immigration rules.127  The 
court notes that an administrative court may not be the proper place for “a 
full blown merits review of policies,” but that does not preclude the court 
from finding rules disproportionate and thus invalid under both domestic and 
European Union case law.128  The court recognizes that requiring a financial 
minimum of £18,600 is excessive and unattainable for many citizens and 
refugees who may wish to live in the U.K. with their spouse.129  The U.K. 
Earnings Index listed 422 occupations in its 2011 edition, and only 301 of 
these occupations earned a yearly salary of or above £18,600.130  If the 
current rule had been in use in 2009, forty-five percent of the sponsors who 
applied would have been denied.131  
However, the opinion fails to do what earlier domestic and Strasbourg 
Court precedent allow courts to do–strike laws down as invalid when they 
are disproportionate.  Instead, the MM Court expressly refused to quash the 
financial requirements Plaintiffs claimed violated their right to respect for 
family life.132  The Court reasoned that the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department—and not the Court—should determine what financial thresholds 
best further the government’s interest in controlling immigration.133  
Rather than leaving British courts to handle appeals when applicants wish 
to contest the Border Agency’s decision, the rules should be structured so 
that Home Department officials have the ability to assess whether or not 
denying an applicant’s request to sponsor rises to the level of an Article 8 
violation.  As currently written, the rules do not give any discretion to the 
officials actually reviewing applications to make exceptions or inquire into 
the reasons why a given applicant may be unable to meet the financial 
requirements.134  While the rules claim to encapsulate Article 8 standards, to 
have balanced, on the front end, individual human rights against the interests 
                                                                                                                   
life.  In terms of the Strasbourg approach they do not represent a fair balance between the 
competing interests and fall outside the margin of appreciations or discretionary area of 
judgment available in policy making in this sphere of administration.”). 
 127 HOME OFFICE, supra note 76, ¶ [39] (“Where the rules have explicitly taken into account 
proportionality, the role of the Courts should shift from reviewing the proportionality of 
individual administrative decisions to reviewing the proportionality of the rules.”). 
 128 MM, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900, [143].  
 129 Id. at [154]–[155].  
 130 Id. at [124].  
 131 Id. at [107].  
 132 Id. at [120]–[121]. 
 133 Id. at [148] (“It will be for the Secretary of State if she sees fit to make such adjustments 
to the rules as will meet the observations in this judgment.”).  
 134 HOME OFFICE, supra note 76. 
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of the state, the case of MM shows that many people who have a right live in 
the U.K. with a spouse will be denied under the current rules.  For example, 
one of the plaintiffs in MM, Shabana Javed, is a British citizen whose local 
job center only offers jobs paying salaries less than £18,000.135  Ms. Javed 
lives in what she describes as an “economically and socially deprived” area 
of Birmingham, England.136  The rules provide no exceptions for someone 
like Ms. Javed who has limited living expenses because of family support 
and whose husband, given his qualifications, would have a better chance than 
Ms. Javed at finding employment.137  The Court’s refusal to quash the rules 
because some applications decided under the current rules will be compatible 
with Article 8 cannot be reconciled with the precedent of Quila, R, 
O’Donoghue and other cases discussed within this Note.  Justice Bradley 
recognizes, “national economic and social data demonstrate that complying 
with these new measures will be particularly difficult for many members of 
the ethnic minority communities and female sponsors where income levels 
have been consistently lower than national averages . . .” and further notes, 
“[t]he income figure is set at a level to make provision for a national average 
for rented accommodation or mortgage repayment, even though house prices 
and rental costs vary dramatically throughout the country.”138  A rule that has 
the known potential to violate an individual’s right to family life cannot be 
sustained. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION  
In Abdulaziz, the Strasbourg Court made this comment on Article 8 and 
the duties it imposes on states bound the terms of the ECHR: “The duty 
imposed by article 8 cannot be considered as extending to a general 
obligation on the part of a contracting state to respect the choice by married 
couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to accept the non-
national spouses for settlement in that country.”139  This is a perfectly 
reasonable statement, and one that makes practical sense for any country 
with a modern immigration system.  Of course country A does not owe an 
unlimited, general duty to a couple from country B who wishes to live in 
                                                                                                                   
 135 MM, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900, [18].  
 136 Id. at [17].  
 137 Id. at [17]–[19] (explaining Ms. Javed’s husband is a civil servant in Pakistan, while she 
has extremely limited qualifications).  
 138 MM, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900, [107].  
 139 Ab dulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, [68] (1985).  
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country A.  For practical reasons, there must be limits on when and who may 
enter a country.  
These limits, however, must not offend guaranteed human rights.  
Additionally, rules promulgated to make entry clearance decisions both 
efficient and uniform are obviously desirable when running a large 
bureaucratic institution, such as the British immigration system, for example.  
Nevertheless, this goal does not justify using overly exclusionary financial 
requirements as an entrance test.  The £18,600 financial threshold British 
citizens must meet in order to sponsor a spouse’s entry is unnecessarily harsh.  
While any immigration application decision resulting in an entry denial is 
going to cause someone anguish, the current financial threshold places an 
undue burden on undeserving citizens—a result prohibited by Article 8 of the 
ECHR.  An exclusionary rule that will overly burden the young (who are often 
students), citizens living in areas with lower costs of living, and Britons living 
in ethnic minority communities140 cannot stand.  Such a rule is not narrowly 
tailored to the government’s stated means: prevention of further burdening the 
country’s welfare system.  By not using the least restrictive means necessary, 
the rule stands in the way of a person’s right to found a family, and does so, for 
many people, without a legitimate aim.  
The decision to deny an application for sponsoring a foreign national 
spouse based on the income level of the spouse living in the U.K. requires an 
individualized review of the type advocated for in the British Supreme Court 
in Quila.  Inquiry into the sufficiency of financial resources would serve a 
dual purpose.  First, it would prevent the exclusion of foreign spouses who 
do not, in fact, place any additional burden on British taxpayers.  Second, it 
would accurately further the government’s stated interests by preventing the 
entry of spouses who would run a high risk of seeking welfare assistance.  
While the court in MM claimed it would be “inappropriate” to strike down 
the financial rules,141 under existing case law this decision was wrong.  The 
court, exercising judicial review, should have followed the precedent 
recognized in the opinion and held the rules as written are inherently 
disproportionate and thus violate the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  
                                                                                                                   
 140 MM, [2013] EWHC (Admin.) 1900, [107].  
 141  Id. at [154] (“For the reasons set out above I conclude that it is not appropriate to strike 
down the financial requirements of the rules under challenge or indeed to seek to encapsulate 
the nuances of this judgment in a formal declaration”).  
